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Abstract: In a recent JME article, Joona Räsänen makes the case for allowing legal age change. We 
identify three problems with his argument and, on that basis, propose an improved version thereof. 
Unfortunately, even the improved argument is vulnerable to the objection that chronological age is 
a better proxy for justice in health than both legal and what we shall call official age. 
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Introduction 
Dutchman Emile Ratelband took to the courts to have the state reduce his age (69) by 20 years to 
avoid (perceived) age discrimination. Against this backdrop, in a recent JME article Joona Räsänen 
makes the following interesting case for legal age change, where to ‘change one’s legal age… 
would mean to change one’s birth date’ in official documents[1]: 
 
‘P1) Legal age is a cause of severe discrimination for some people whose biological and 
emotional age do not match their chronological age. 
P2) People should be allowed to secure relief from severe discrimination against them 
unless this has excessive consequences.  
P3) Changing a person's legal age would not, in the case of people whose biological and 
emotional age do not match their chronological age, have excessive consequences.  
C) People whose biological and emotional age do not match their chronological age should 
be allowed to change their legal age in order to secure relief from discrimination.’ 
 
Critics have identified various problems with Räsänen’s argument. However, these problems can be 
accommodated by an argument which is quite close to Räsänen’s. Unfortunately, this revised 
argument is defeated by a different objection in healthcare settings. In these settings, there is a 
strong reason in favour of treating people on the basis of their chronological age and, thus, not 
permitting age change. 
 
An improved case against chronological age 
There are three problems with Räsänen’s argument. First, the argument as stated is invalid, because 
it rests on a suppressed premise asserting that legal age change secures relief from severe age 
discrimination. Some critics doubt that it would and argue that it is preferable to eliminate unjust 
age discrimination altogether[2]. The last point might be true. However, eliminating unjust age 
discrimination is difficult. Hence, Räsänen might simply restrict the scope of his argument to non-
ideal situations in which, regrettably, severe age discrimination exists. The former point is correct. 
Adjusting one’s legal age is not a guarantee against age discrimination. Still, the argument could 
work with the weaker assumption that age adjustment provides some relief or relief for some 
people[3]. 
 Second, while P3 might be true, its scope is problematically restricted to ‘people whose 
biological and emotional age do not match their chronological age’. However, other people too 
‘should be allowed to secure relief from severe [age] discrimination’ when this does not have 
‘excessive consequences’[4]. In defence of his restriction of the scope of P3, Räsänen mentions the 
desirability of avoiding abuse of the option of legal age change, but it is unclear why this concern 
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cannot be addressed simply by the requirement that no-legal/experienced age-gap people document 
their predicament discrimination-wise when applying for age change.   
 Third, some critics believe that P3 is false because it implicates the state in lying, since to 
change someone’s legal age the state must change this person’s date of birth on official 
documents[5]. Whether this is morally objectionable or not, an argument which is in the spirit of 
Räsänen’s is immune to this objection. That argument concerns citizens’ official age. We define, 
stipulatively, official age as the date-of-birth-independent age that the state ascribes to its citizens. 
As a default that age could, but need not, be one’s chronological age, or, in cases where a person is 
granted a different age to gain some relief from age discrimination, a different one. Like legal age in 
Räsänen’s sense – ‘the number one gets by subtracting one’s [legally acknowledged] birth date from 
the current date’[5] – official age can deviate from chronological age. Unlike legal age in Räsänen’s 
sense, official age is not tied to date of birth and, thus, does not imply that official documents state a 
date of birth, e.g., they could simply state one’s official age in the year the document is issued. 
Whatever the merits of the notion of official age, it cannot be dismissed on the ground that its 
adoption results in the state becoming complicit in lying. Anyone would acknowledge official age 
as a date-of-birth-independent legal construction. Thus, to accommodate the three objections above 
we could embrace the following simple and clearly valid modus ponens (the official age argument):  
 
P2*) If the following conditional is true – if the state were to treat citizens on the basis of 
their official age and if people were allowed to change their legal age in order to secure 
some relief from discrimination, then it would secure people some relief from severe and 
otherwise unavoidable discrimination against them without excessive consequences – then 
the state should treat citizens on the basis of their official age and people should be allowed 
to change their legal age in order to secure some relief from discrimination.  
P3*) If the state were to treat citizens on the basis of their official age and if people were 
allowed to change their official age in order to secure some relief from discrimination, then 
it would secure people some relief from severe and otherwise unavoidable discrimination 
against them without excessive consequences. 
C*) The state should treat citizens on the basis of their official age and people should be 
allowed to change their official age in order to secure some relief from discrimination. 
 
Why it would be unjust for the healthcare system to treat people on the basis of official age 
Unfortunately, P3* is false. When it comes to scarce health care resources, if the state were to set 
health care priorities on the basis of official age it would amount to an injustice which plausibly 
qualifies as an ‘excessive consequence’. Consider a situation where a number of scarce live-saving 
organs must be distributed by a public healthcare system among two groups of patients. Everyone 
has the official age of 50. However, members of the first group have the chronological age of 70, 
while members of the second have the chronological age of 40. Suppose that everyone will enjoy an 
extra 10 good life years if they receive an organ. On the official age argument, implausibly the state 
should not decide this issue on the basis of chronological age. Yet members of the first group have 
enjoyed 30 more good life years than members of the second group, and that is relevant for who 
should receive the available organs, justice-wise. Even if a member of the second group were to 
receive an organ, she would still not have enjoyed as many good life years as members of the first 
group who do not receive one. Hence, P3* (and, in our view, C* too) is false. 
 This view is true on a wide range of different accounts of justice in healthcare. First, if 
justice requires equalizing bad brute luck across patients, generally, we should give priority to 
younger (chronological age-wise) patients over older patients[6]. Second, on the view that priority 
should be given to the worse off (where one is worse off the worse one’s life as a whole is), the 
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same conclusion follows[7]. Finally, on the ‘fair innings view’, according to which justice requires 
that everyone enjoys a sufficient number of good life years, justice requires taking into account 
chronological age in our scenario, if 60 good life years is what a fair inning amounts to[8].  
  On all of these views, chronological age is a better proxy for what matters from the point of 
view of justice than official age (and, for that matter, legal age). Indeed, this is so if neither of these 
views exhausts justice in healthcare, but only captures one component in it alongside other 
components, e.g., a requirement to the effect that everyone enjoys some chance, though possibly a 
discounted chance in the case of those who are octogenarians in terms of their chronological age, of 
being given a life-saving operation[9]. 
 Hence, in important healthcare settings the state should treat people on the basis of their 
chronological age rather than official age, when it should treat patients (partly) on the basis of age. 
Perhaps there are other contexts in which the state should treat people on the basis of their official, 
rather than their chronological, age (or, for that matter, not treat on the basis of any notion of age at 
all). Hence, one might either see our argument as an objection to Räsänen’s argument or, 
alternatively, as a friendly, but for healthcare purposes, crucial amendment[1]. 
 
References 
1 Räsänen J. Moral case for legal age change. JME 2019;45:461-464, p. 461. 
2 Brassington I. What a drag it is getting old: Response to Räsänen. JME 2019;45:467-468, p. 467. 
3 Räsänen J. Further defence of legal age change. JME 2019;45:471-472. 
4 Saad T C. Against the nihilism of ‘legal age change’: Response to Räsänen. JME 2019;45:465-
466.  
5 Simkulet W. On legal age change. JME 2019;45:469-470, p. 469. 
6 Segall S. Health, Luck, and Justice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2010. 
7 Parfit D. Equality and priority. In: Mason A., ed. Ideals of Equality. Oxford: Blackwell 1998:1-
20. 
8 Harris J. The Value of Life. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1970. 
9 Kamm FM. Bioethical Prescriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013. 
  
 
1 We thank Andreas Albertsen, Andreas Bengtson, Göran Duus-Otterström, Søren Flinch 
Midtgaard, Lauritz Munch, Lasse Nielsen, Viki Pedersen, and Fabio Wolkenstein for helpful 
comments. We are also grateful to Joona Räsänen for perceptive written comments on a previous 
version of this paper. 
                                                 
